Southern Business Review
Volume 12

Issue 1

Article 5

April 1986

FOMC Members' Selection, Background and Voting
Richard H. Puckett
East Tennessee State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr
Part of the Business Commons, and the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Puckett, Richard H. (1986) "FOMC Members' Selection, Background and Voting," Southern Business
Review: Vol. 12: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr/vol12/iss1/5

This article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Southern Business Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu.

FOMC MEMBERS' SELECTION
BACKGRO UND AN D VOTING
Richard H. Puckett

'

Researc~ concerning monetary policy has focused mainly on topics such
as how policy effects should be embedded in macro-models or what should
be chmen a5 intermediate targecs. By contra\l, thb paper explores how so~ial and po~itical factors affecc monetary policy. In particular, its pu rpose
1s to mvesllgate how Federal Open Market Committee member selection
procedures and member backgrounds affect policy. These aspects of the
decision-making process are ones that politicians and members of the public
are often concerned about, yet ones 1ha1 acadcmic5 have ,eldom explored.'
Are the\e popular concern, regarding the hack grounds of policy makers and
the structure of the Federal Rcsen e System misguided? Or are these factors
really significant?
Preliminary research suggest\ that these clements do indeed make a differem:e. Relati,e to the disscnt~ of member, of chc Board of Governors, dissencs of Resene Bani,. presidents on the domestic monetary policy directive
have been more heavily weighted to"'ard tighter rather than easier policy.
On the other hand, dissents of go,ernor~ appointed by Democratic U.S. presidents have been much more in the easier direction. (See [9).)
The \I.or!,. here: extend, thi, re,carch by, among other things, exploring additional social and political variables explaining HJMC member voting. The
variables include one, that represent training and outlooi.. of the members,
such as whether their previous experience wa, in the public or private sector,
and variables thac reflect the general political environment, such as whether
a pre,idential election \\a, close at hand . Unlike the previous work. based
on contingency table analysi,, the principal tool of analysb is a multivariate
discrete choice model, de~cribed in greater detail below. Apparently, this is
the first application of the model to dccbion~ regarding monetary policy.
The data explained by the model are ,otes on the domestic monetary policy directi,e from 1959 to 1982. The \tarting date \\a~ d10~en because it wa~
the first year in the post-Accord c:ra when a dissent on the directive was recorded. Only vote\ in regular meetings were considered. (Telephone meetings only
occurred in the latter part of the period, and records for these meetings for
several years were incomplete.)
The paper itself is divided into a number of sections. The first re,iewi
descriptive data regarding H>MC member ocrnpational and educational
backgrounds. The second sets up the random choice model of voting a nd
the specific hypotheses to be tested. The third summarize~ the empirical results
from estimating and testing the model. The fourth reviews the main conclusions from the 1,1,ork.
To anticipate some of the fi ndings, educational and occupational backgrounds do seem to play a noticeable role in explaining FOMC member voting. However, organizational a nd political fac tors such as the position of
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ember within the Federal Reserve System and the source of a member',
:;ointmenl to the Commiuee (e.g., b~ a Democ ratic or Republican U.S .
presiden() seem to play an even more 1mportan1 role.

I. A Rcvie" of Member Backgrounds
Table J shows a cross-classification of FOMC votes by members' back attorney, and economists ~epending
grounds. Member, were designated
on whether they had degrees in law or ad\ anced degrees in economics. Members were also classified as to whether tbeir background was mainly in the
private sector, the public sector, or the Federal Reserve System - given !heir
experience in the five years before they were first appointed as governors
or Reserve Bani. presidents. In this context, the public sector included not
only government other than the Federal Reserve bu! also private, nonprofit
organizations such as universities. These were treated as pare of the public
sector since their outlook is probably more like government than profitseeking organizations.
The 1ablc indicates 1hat a sub\tamial proponion of 1he votes \\ere cast
by individuals with training as attorneys and economists and with previous
experience with the Federal Reserve. The result, however, ~hould be interpreted with care. The tabulations count each \0te a s having equal weight.
While this is literally true, the Chairmen in practice have had a dbpropor1ionate influence in the Commiltee's delibcra1ions (7, 109- 1111 . b en ,o, 1he
Chairmen's backgrounds have not differed greatly from their colleagues except in a greater tendency for Chairmen to come from outside !he System.
In all, the evidence is no1 consistent with the caricature sometimes draY.n
of monetary policy as being made mainly by bankers and bminessmen. If
they do play ~uch a dominant role, it is behind I he ,cenc~ . Given large number or votes from indhiduals with backgrounds from \1ithin thc Federal
Reserve, the picture is more consistent with tbe view " . .. or 1he Federal
Reserve System as a bureau, run by individuals who scel. to maintain the
autonomy of their organization . . . " [ 10, 65].

a,

II. A Model 01· Voting
To model voting, it is nccc~~ary to c,tablish 1c,tabk con~truct~ to reflect
choice among a limited number of discrete alternati\es (e.g., a \Ole "for",
"against", or "abstain") rather than movemenb in a continuous variable
over a wide range. A multivariate discrete choice model provides a clear-cut
basi, for specifying and tc5ting hypothc~e, \I hen indi\iduah face sud1 a limited menu of options. In the model, corresponding to each option is a utility
function with the characteristics of the decision-maker serving as arguments.
To each function is added a random variable to represent unobserved influences affecting each choice. A decision then reflects whatever alternative
Yit;lds the greatest utility.'
In the case at hand, FOMC member, were faced y,,ith three alternatives
concerning the proposed domestic policy directive - a vote for it, a dissent
10 favor of a tighter policy, or a dissent in favor of an easier one. ("Tight33

-TABLE l
FOMC VOTING BY
ME~IBER BACKGROUND
1959-1982
A.
Private
Ex. Nonprofit
Government &
Nonprofit Private
Federal Reserve
Sub-Total

Number of Votes

Economics
122

Law
337

Other
528

1012

217

232

1461

961

57

433

1451

2095

611

1193

3699

Sub-Total
987

8. Percent of Total

Economics

Law

Other

Sub-Total

3 .1

8.6

13.S

2s.3

Government &
Nonprofit Private

26.0

S.6

6.0

37.5

Federal Reserve

24.6

1.5

11.1

37 .2

Sub-Total

53.7

15.7

30.6

100.0

Private
Ex. Nonprofit
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" ier" was defined in term~ of whatever indicator - intcrc!,t ~ates,
er or cas
ates or some other - that the dissenter focused on m exmon~taryh~sg~~:!s as.reported in the policy record in Board of _~overnor's
pressing
F
ample if a FOMC member dissented citmg a need
Annual Reports. or ex
,
. ,,
ror a tower rate o f grO\\·th ·1n Ml or a need to rai~e the Federal lunus rate
target the dissent would be classified as tight~r.')
.
Corresponding to each alternative was a u11ltty function
Uh = l: ahkxk + ch
h = I, 2, 3
k
,,here the %1.'s were the coefficicrH~ in the hth utility function, the 'k's
l'ariables representing voter and other attribute, affecting thedeci~ion. a_nd
eh's, the additive random variable. The probability that the Jth alternatl\C
would be chosen is given by
Pr {ei - ej

i ajkXt-. -

aikxk

for all i if, j l •

Given this formulation it might be tempting to apply ordinary least squares,
using a dummy variable as a dependent \'ariable to represent a gi\'en choice,
with voter and other attributes as explanatory variab les. Hoy,c\er, there arc
serious problems with this approach. Among them are hctero~ccdasticity and
estimated probahilitie\ 1\ith ,alues out~ide the 0 10 I range {5, 248-250).
A common alternative is to a ~umc that the error term~ are independent
and distributed according 10 a multivariate logi~tic distribution. In con~equence, the probability of the jth choice is'
Pj = exp(Uj) /l:exp(Uhlh

Now it is straight-forward 10 form a likelihood function for ,ample data
and derive maximum likelihood t:stimates of the ahk in the underlying utility
functions. However, to get a mapping of sample data into a unique ,et of
parameter value~ it is also necessary to imp05c identifying restrictions
"tk + azk + "3k = 0
for all k.
It remains to ~pecify the observable. underlying variables determining the

utility of each alternative. These were dummy \ariablcs reflecting ~arious
attributes thought to affect voting - those concerning members' personal
characteristics and training; those relating to the ,tructure of the Federal
Reserve Syslem and the selection of l·Oi\1C member,; and those rcprc,entiog lhe general political and soc.:ial environment (table 2).
Among variables representing member~· personal backgrounds were one~
re0ecting an individual's experience in the five years prior to his appointment as a member of the FOMC. In particular. variables were included to
caplure differential effects. if any, from public or private sector experience.
Officials with private sector backgrounds reputedly are mor.: conservative
and more inclined to vote for tighter policies, while officials with public sector backgrounds presumably are more liberal and more likely to vote on the
easier side. Variables were also included to represent members' training as
35
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TABLE 2
PARA.'!ETER ESTIMATES FOR RArlDOH CHOICE MODELS*
1959-80
Model 1

Variable

Tighter

Intercept

- .387

(-1.304)

Private sector

-

Model 2

E"s l~r

Tighter

-2.740
(-8.814)

Easter

-3.186
(-37.131)

- .686
(-3.071)

.503
(-l.850)

.711
( 2.550)

.183
.797)

- .387
(-1.660)

.537
(-2.369)

.694
2.954)

- .600
(-3.408)

-1.096
(-2.836)

.234
.62 7)

- .865
(-7.827)

.231
1.192)

(- .904)

- .126
.43J)

.067
.22 9)

Vice Chairman

- .810
(-2.118)

1.100
2,875)

.727
(-2.082)

1.045
( 2.994)

Covernor

,843
(-J.024)

.70J
2.446)

- ,841
(-3.134)

( 2.536)

Governor appointed
by Democratic pr"sldent

- .590
(-2.065)

.928
J.275)

- .638
(-2.J49)

l .005
( 3,755)

Presidential
election year

.237
1,007)

- .352
(-1.463)

Other FOMC members
vote tighter**

1.527
6.588)

- .631
(-2.536)

1.448
7 .573)

- .560
(-2 .614)

Other FOMC members

- .411,
(-1.616)

1.434
5. 970)

- .525
(-2.292)

1.538
( 7,181)

ex. nonprofit
Govern:nent

private

& non-profit

Econorolst
Attorney
Over 55
First 12 votes on
FOMC

vote easier••*

-

(-

-

-

-

4-116)

.178
(- 2.246)
(

.800
4 .283)

.176

*
"t" values in parentheses.
•• The number of dissents tighter exceeds the number easier.
••• The number of dissents easter exceeds the number tl8ht<J r .
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economists or attorneys. The hypothesis wa~ that _training as professionals
ly on their own judgement might result in more rndependence and a great10 re
b
. h b
er propensity to dissent. In addition, ~ec~use older mem er!, m1g I _e more
conservative, a variable was used to indicate whether a member wa~ o,~r
55. A further consideration was whether a vote ,,a~ among the mem~er \
first twelve FOMC votes, since perhap\ ne,~ members would be le,s mdined
to dissent.
Among the variables relating to the structure of the Sy!,tem and the selection of FOMC member\ wa, one for thc Vice Chairman of the Board. ii
was hypothesized that, owing to his special status, the Vice Chairman might
tend to exercise more independence and therefore be more likely to dissent.
There were also variables to test with a more !,Ophisticated model previous
findings that governors over-all and governors appointed by Democratic U.S.
presidents had diflerenl voting ra1terns than Rcwnc Bani.. presidents.
The final set of variable\ wa~ 10 caplllre ,omc: political and social background effects. i\n indicator 10 show whether a vote ,,as tal..en within ten
months of a Presidential election wa~ introduced to detect any influence of
the campaign on Commiuee voting. Two variable\ were added to reflect
whether other 1--0MC member!, at a given meeting had, on bala111.:e. di!,\ented and, if they had, in what direction. Pre~umably if other membef\ wen:
dissenting, someone at the same meeting would be more lil-ely to rear t ,imilarly. Accordingly, one dummy variable showed 'hhether FOI\IC members,
other than the one under consideration. had dbsentec.J and voted on balance
for a tighter policy. Another ,ariable indiratcc.J if l·OMl' mcmber!>, other
than the one und.:r consideration. dissented and \ otec.J on net for an ea,ier
policy.

Ill. Empirkal Result~

The data u,ed to 1c,t thc,c hypothe,e, 1,c1 c for 1959-80 - I 981-82 being
resencd a, a hold-out samrle. The Chairmen·, vote, 1\crc excluded 0\ er th~
entire 1979-82 period since during that time a Chairman never dis~ented.
As might be expected, the initial maximum lil..elihood estimates yielded
a numher of insignificant rnefficients (table 2, model I). All, ariabb with
"t's': Ii:,, than 1.5 in ah,olutc ,aluc ,,erc arbitrarily droprcd, and the rema,mng parameter\ were re-estimated (model 2). The "t" for the coefficient,
on the entire sub-set of eliminated ,ariable, "a" .352).
Table 3 shows the incremental effect of each variable in the re-c~timated
rclationshir. The effect wa" measured by the change in probability when the
1aluc of the given dummy, ariabh.: "" itched from 1cm to one, all other variables he~d at their mean, for 1959-80 reriod. To put the,e rrobabilitic\ in
~~rspec11_ve, f~r the en~ir.: 1_959-82 sample period ).8 percent of all votes \\Crc
ssents m _a lighter d1rert1on; 2.8 percent 'here di!,sent, on the easier !,ide.
As seen
the table, one of the more important factof'i in determining
the probability of a vote: on the tighter or easier sic.Jc 'ha, the ,ource of the
member's appointment to the 1--0MC. Consistent with previou!, findings
governors who were Democratic appointees were most lil-ely to vote for eas~
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TABLE 3
VOTI~G PROBABILITIES
l959-1980
Variable

Incremental
Probability of Votas•
Tighter

Private sector ex. nonprofit

- .2

Gover~~ent & nonprofit private sectors

(%)

Easier
5.4

o.o

-0.1

-1.2

,3

2.0

- ,8

Vice Chair:oan

-0.4

4 ,7

Governor

-

.8

5 ,2

Economist
Attorney

.a

9. 7

Other FOMC me~bers vote tighter**

9,7

.3

Other FO~C oerabers vote easier***

2,3

30,0

Governor appointed by Democratic president

*Change 1n probability as the indicated variable changes from Oto 1,
wlth the remaining variables evaluated at their means. Because of the
identifying resLrictlons imposed, the incremental probability of no
dissent is opposite in sign to the sum of the incremental probability
probabilities for votes tlghter and easier.
** Nuober dissents tighter exceeds number of dissents easier.
*** Number dissents easier exceeds number of dissents tighter.

ier policies; Republican appointees lO the Board were nc,t mo~r likely lO opt
such policies; v.hile Reserve Bank presidents \\ere the least likely to vote on
the easier side.
There was a noticeable proclivity on the part of FOMC members with private sec!Or bad.ground, to\ ote in an ea,ier din:ction, contrary to their reputation as being ~ore conservative. In addition, there was some evidence that
economists tended to oppose tighter policies, and attorneys tended to favor
them.
To test the robustness of the result~, simulations of the dissents were made
for 1981-82. Each \imulatcd dissent was determined on the basis of the esti·
mated expected utilities. That is, each was determined on the basis of whether
a tighter or easier dissent would have yielded a greater utility, given no ran·
dom shock. The simulations were compared with naive forecasts that all dissents would be tighter (the more frequent type of dissent during 1959-SO).
Though the sample was small, the model successfully discriminated between
tighter and easier dissents and outperformed the naive forecasts (table 4)38

TABLE 4
SIMULATIONS OF DISSENTS

1981-1982
Number of
Votes

Naive
Forecasts*

Random
Choice Model

7. Correct

19

73.7

68.4

•All dissents are tighter.
I\ . Conclu~ion,
To sum up, economists and attorney, - not bankers and businessmen ha\e played a dominant part in FOIi.iC voting. Moreover. the Federal Resen e
itself has been a major training ground for FOl\tC members, consistent with
the hypothesis that the System acts like a self-perpetuating bureaucracy.
The Resene Bani- presidents - the FO\1C m.:mbers mo,t remo\ed from
the electoral process - ha\e been much les, likely to dissent on the easier
side, less even than the Republican appointees to the Board. This suggests
that member selection procedures and insulation from the political process
have played an important role in determining policy choices.
Educational and occupational background~ of FO'.\1l member, ha\ t!
played a part as well. Most notably. members \\ith pri\ate sector back grounds, despite their consenati\e reputation, ha\t! tended to dissent in the
easier side.
FOOTNOTES
' Balles (2] gives a discussion of ,ome of the issues in\ olved. Ha\ rilesky.
Yohe, and Schirm (6] have done some "ork concerning the economic affiliations of Resene Bank directors.
' McFadden [8] elegantly lays out the general model and alternatives in estimating it. Dhrymcs (4, 324-352] CO\er~ ~ome of the same ground but in
a more accessible fashion. Amemiya (I) also discusses models of this type
at some length .
'See, for example, (4, 340-344).
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